

THE
Duke of Anjou's
S U C C E S S I O N
C O N S I D E R E D,

As to its Legality and Consequences ;

W I T H

REFLECTIONS on the *French* King's M E M O R I A L to the *Dutch*, and on what may be the Interest of the several Princes and States of Christendom, with Respect to the present Conjunction.

To which is added at large, because refer'd to in the Book,
The Clause of *Louis* XIV's Contract of Marriage, renouncing the *Spanish* Succession.

His Ratification of the same.

His Queen, the Infanta's Renunciation.

The Article of the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, and

The Clause of *Philip* IV's Will, confirming the said Renunciations.

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P R E F A C E

WHAT Follows being the sudden Thoughts of one that wishes well to the Interest of Europe in general, and of Great Britain in particular, he hopes they will be taken as kindly as he meant them honestly. We have reason to bless the Almighty, for the happiness of our Constitution, that our own Princes (if any of them should ever be so wicked as to attempt it) have no right (without our own Consent) to dispose of our Purfes, and much less of our Allegiance, and Persons by Wills and Codicils, as every ordinary Man does of his Goods and Chattels. It remains then, since we are free from such dangers at home, that those concern'd should bethink themselves of proper Measures to prevent any such Attempts upon us from abroad. We don't know how far a late Precedent of that Nature may be drawn into Example. We ought to consider that besides Foreign Pretenders, there are others alledg'd to be come from English Loins, that claim a right to our Succession. It's hard to say what may be brought upon us of this Nature by a Match said to be in proposal betwixt a certain Princess, and a third Grandson, which perhaps may give rise to another betwixt a Titular Prince, and some near Kinswoman. It concerns us then, since

Preface.

our established Line of Succession can scarcely make up a Plurality, to take care that no Foreigner have an opportunity of offering to settle it for us, as they have done for others. In order to this, it's possible to do either too much or too little; both which Extremes the Wisdom of the Nation knows best how to avoid. But so far may be safely advanc'd, that to enter into Foreign Alliances, especially with such Protestants as can assist us with a Naval Force, and to take all proper Methods for preserving a good Correspondence with our Neighbours at home, would seem to be one of the best Methods to deprive those of the Power that we have reason to think have the most Inclination to give us trouble on that Head.

The Duke of Anjou's Succession

CONSIDERED, &c.

THE Duke of *Anjou's* Succession to the Crown of *Spain*, and the Consequences that may attend it, is a Subject of such Importance and universal Concern, that it deservedly exercises the Tongues and Thoughts of all men of sense.

As to the Succession it self; it's generally known, (1.) That this Prince is advanced to the Throne of *Spain*, contrary to the Laws of that Kingdom; which do not allow the Alienation of the Crown, nor that it should fall under the Dominion of a Stranger, the Succession being settled by the consent of the States of the Kingdom on the House of *Arragon* or *Austria*.

2. That it is contrary to the Renunciation made by *Lewis 13.* and the Infanta *Mary Ann* his Wife, at the time of their Marriage; the Legality of which was not then controverted.

3. That it is against the Renunciation made by *Lewis XIV.* the present *French* King, and his Wife the Infanta *Mary Therese*, at the time of their Marriage.

4. That it is against the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, of which that Renunciation was the chief ground-work.

5. That it is contrary to the Will of *Philip IV.* pursuant to that Renunciation.

6. That it is contrary to the Treaty of Partition, agreed on betwixt *France, England* and *Holland*.

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7. That it is expressly contrary to all the Arguments formerly made use of by *Louis XIV.* against the Renunciations by his Father and Mother, and by himself and his Wife, and is directly chargeable with the same Injustice against the *Dauphin* and the Duke of *Burgundy*, that he formerly charged upon the above mentioned Renunciations; and is by consequence condemned in that very Memorial, which pretends to justify the Duke of *Anjou's* Succession, since it expressly asserts the *Dauphin's* right to the Crown, and the nullity of his Mother's Renunciation.

These things being uncontrovertably true; It remains that the Duke of *Anjou* can have no other Title to the Crown of *Spain*, but what he claims by the Will of his late Catholick Majesty *Charles II.* For tho' the unanimous desire of the Subjects of *Spain* be also alledged, it is only brought in as a secondary Plea; upon which the Memorial lays no great stress; besides, we hear nothing of any previous Invitation by the *Cortes* or States of *Spain*: so that this Argument has no solid bottom. If there be any future Agreement of the States to the Duke of *Anjou's* Title, it will certainly be look'd upon by the World as the effect of Force, and not of Choice, which lays his Title open to dangerous objections.

To return to the late King of *Spain's* Will, which is the Duke of *Anjou's* best Tenure; we find there is this to be said against it. 1. That it is contrary to a former Will, and that also the Will of the Father to the last Testator, which is no great Argument of Piety in those that put him upon making it. We shall say nothing as to his own part in it, since Decency commands us to tread softly on the Grave of a deceased Prince, and Compassion forbids us to disturb the Ashes of a Monarch after his death, who enjoy'd so little of the Comforts of Life.

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2. This Will can in no ways be esteem'd so valid as that of *Philip IV.* because the latter was made pursuant to the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, and the solemn Renunciation of two successive Kings and Queens of *France*, ratified by all the Legislative Power of *France* and *Spain*: whereas the Will of King *Charles II.* is contrary to all these.

3. The Will of *Philip IV.* was agreeable to the civil Law, and the Decretal of Pope *Boniface VIII.* which says, *that every Renunciation made upon Oath by a Daughter above 12 Years of age, in favour of her Father, in order to Contract of Marriage, by which a sufficient dowry is assign'd her, ought to be good in Law, tho she be then under the Jurisdiction of her Father.* All which Conditions met in the Queen of *France's* Renunciation. Whereas the late King of *Spain's* Will is contrary to this Decretal, which certainly all *Roman Catholics* ought to have a special regard to.

4. The Will of *Charles II.* of *Spain*, is objected against by the Emperor, as made when that Prince was in no Condition to dictate, much less to write a Will so well digested, and so subtly fram'd, and introduc'd by such a politick Preface, as this Will appears to be. This Objection has so much the more strength, that it is founded upon the known weakness both of Body and Mind, which that poor Prince had laboured under for so long a time, and does no way look like the Composure of one struggling with the violence of such a Distemper as he died of.

5. 'Tis objected against this Will, that 'twas the contrivance of a *French* Faction, and forc'd upon that unhappy Prince, almost in *Articulo mortis*, by the Cardinal *De Porto Carero*, on pain of being denied Absolution; the most frightful thing in the world to a bigotted *Papist*, such as that Prince was known to be. This Objection is

so much the more forcible, that the late King of *Spain* was obliged by all the Ties of Laws, Treatys, Nature and Inclination, to prefer a Prince of the House of *Austria* to all others for his Successor ; and it's sufficiently known, that but a very little before the making of this Will, he had made another in favour of the Arch-Duke.

6. It's objected against this Will, that the *Spaniards* were brib'd and hector'd into a compliance with it by the *Menaces* of the *French*, &c. and the marching of their Troops before that Prince's Death, to take possession of the Dominions of *Spain* ; that the *French* King claim'd by virtue of the Treaty of Partition, which it would seem by the Memorial presented to the *Dutch*, the *French* entred into for no other end.

7. It's objected against this Will, that it seems no way likely to prevent the uniting of the Crown of *Spain* to that of *France*, tho that be one of the chief pretended ends of it. This will appear by the Will it self, which leaves the Duke of *Anjou* at liberty to accept the Crown of *France*, in case the Duke of *Burgundy* die without Issue Male, provided he call the Duke of *Berry* to succeed him as King of *Spain*. That this is a very dangerous and impracticable Proviso, will readily appear if we consider the Ambition that's inseparable from most Crown'd Heads, and particularly from the Family of *Bourbon*, and the Genius of *France*. It's well enough known, that the design of that Crown for the Universal Monarchy, is not of Yesterday ; and that in order to it, the uniting of the Crown of *Spain* to that of *France*, has been one of the things that the Court of *France* hath most passionately desired, and industriously attempted. The case being so, it's scarcely supposable, that a Prince of such a high Spirit, as the Duke of *Anjou* appears to be, will readily quit his pretensions to the Crown of *Spain*, of
which

which he has the possession, ev'n tho the Crown of *France* should likewise devolve upon him.

It's in vain to object the Example of *Henry III.*, who left the Crown of *Poland*, to take upon him that of *France*, after the death of his Brother *Charles IX.* The case is no way parallel, the Crown of *Poland* is infinitely short of that of *Spain* : Nor had *Henry III.* any Title to it by Birth, or opportunity of keeping it, by reason of its distance from *France*, and the Constitution of the Government ; whereas the Duke of *Anjou* in the case above-mentioned, will claim the Crown of *Spain* as his Birth-right, will have an opportunity of putting his Friends into the Administration, and by that means of acquiring a strong Faction in *Spain* to support it ; and besides this he will have the Power of *France* to maintain it. This cannot be rejected as a vain Speculation, by those who consider, that the two Kingdoms lye contiguous, and that the King of *Spain* may have his *French* Troops in readiness when he pleases, to force such *Spaniards* into a compliance as be refractory to it.

But because this Hypothesis may be objected against as too remote, since tis probable the Duke of *Burgundy* may have Heirs enough for the Crown of *France* : We shall now come to those things that seem nearer in view. And,

1. It must be granted, that the Duke of *Anjou* is a Prince of *France*, and by consequence that Nature obliges him to love his native Country.

2. It must be allowed, that he owes his Accession to the Crown of *Spain* altogether to his Grandfather the present *French* King.

3. It cannot be denied, that he is under a necessity to govern himself chiefly by his Grandfather's advice, and must depend upon his Protection for the continuance of his new Dignity.

From

From all which it naturally results, that the Government of *Spain* under the Duke of *Anjou*, must be so administered, as to fall in with the designs of *Lewis XIV.* otherwise it is in his power to develt the Duke of *Anjou* of his Sovereignty when he pleases, and to possess his Father the *Dauphin* of what is asserted in the Memorial to be his Birth-right.

It is in vain to object, that the *Spaniards* will not allow their new King to take those measures: for 'tis evident they have no Power to do it. His Grandfather can assist him at pleasure with such a Land and Naval Force as they are in no condition to resist, tho their whole Power were united against him; much less will it be possible for them to do it, when their own King acts in concert with him. This is demonstrable if we consider, 1. That the Duke of *Anjou* will always have a considerable Faction, because of the necessary dependance that many of the *Grande*s, &c. must have upon his Person and Court. The power of conferring Honours and beneficial Posts in the Church, State, Army and Fleet, hath irresistible Charms attending it. The Governments of *Pern*, *Mexico*, *Sicily*, *Naples*, *Milan*, and that of the *Spanish Netherlands*, and the great Posts in the Church, Armies, &c. of those Kingdoms and Provinces, besides what his Majesty has to dispose of in the several Kingdoms that go under the general Denomination of *Spain*, conferr'd upon needy and ambitious *Grande*s, or others, by the private intercession of *France*, and the free Gift of the Duke of *Anjou*, will certainly oblige them to prosecute his Interest, tho never so opposite to that of their Country. This Age affords but few Instances of men that are proof against such Temptations. What Kingdoms are there in *Europe*, where Princes that have been minded to advance their Prerogative, have not found Persons of the highest Ranks, capable

capable of being brib'd by Honours, Places and Pensions, to sacrifice their Religion and Liberty to the ambition of their Monarchs? And why should we think that Virtue predominates in *Spain* more than in other Nations?

2. If we consider that the King of *France* hath for many years been the declared Champion of Popery, against that which is called the *Northern* Heresy: If we consider, that his Eye to the *Spanish* Succession was one of the principal reasons for that cruel and otherwise impolitick Persecution of his Protestant Subjects, because he knew it would recommend him and his Family to the bigotted *Spaniards*; and if we likewise consider with what Impudence the arrogant Court of Inquisition declared against their late King's joining in confederacy against *France*, with those they are pleased to call Hereticks: We may soon be convinced that his Interest in those waspish Ecclesiasticks is, and may be such, as will bring the rest of *Spain* to a speedy compliance. He has no more to do but to possess them with an opinion that he will imploy the united Power of *Spain* and *France* for the propagation of the Catholick Faith, and the Extirpation of Hereticks; and then he may assure himself of all the assistance that Priestcraft can make him. Had it not been for these and such like Considerations, there's not the least reason to doubt, but the *Spaniards* who are known to be politick enough, would rather have call'd the Arch Duke to their Throne, than have endangered their Liberty by the Power of *France*: but as matters are at present, they had no other way left them, but to hug their Chains, and make their unavoidable Slavery as easy to them as possible: It being dangerous to provoke those, whose Power they must of necessity submit to.

That *Spain* will every day become more and more liable to the Power of *France*, and in danger of being subjected by

by that Crown, is further evident from this: That the *Spaniards* must unavoidably be indebted to the *French* King in great Sums; for besides what he has formerly alledg'd to be wanting of the *Infanta's* Portion, he offers to reimburse the *Dutch* several Millions that are owing to them by the *Spaniards*, on condition that they evacuate the *Spanish* Garisons in the *Netherlands*, where their Troops keep possession at present. He likewise promises them the assistance of his Fleet, to drive the *Moors* from before *Genta*; and in case of a War with the Emperor, which seems unavoidable soon or late, there's no question but all the expence he is at in opposing the Emperor on that head, must be charg'd to the account of *Spain*; and as it's probable, the Emperor will endeavour to engage Allies in the Quarrel with him, that have a Naval Force capable of giving the *French* a diversion, and of securing the *West-Indies* to the House of *Austria*, that will still contract a further debt upon *Spain* for the assistance of the *French* Naval Force, for which the *French* King will no doubt expect or take very good security of Frontier Towns, Sea-Ports, whole Provinces, or otherwise. Nay supposing there should not yet be any actual War for some years upon this account, the very Expences of his Marches and Countermarches, and of his Naval Preparations to set and maintain his Grandson upon the Throne of *Spain*, will lay such a burden of debt upon that Crown, as will always afford a good pretence for the present, or any future King of *France*, to endeavour the seizing of it; and who knows what private Articles of this nature there may be betwixt him, and his Grandson, and his Trustees the *Frenchify'd Spaniards*? For now adays it seems, it's the custom of all Treaties to have such Articles. If this should be the case, the Duke of *Ajou* has made no bad Exchange, if he be but really

Viceroy

Viceroy of *Spain*, and the Dominions thereunto belonging, under his Grandfather or Father, it's infinitely better than any Appanage he could pretend to, as a Son of *France*.

This it's suppos'd may be enough to convince those Gentlemen of their mistake, who say, that when the Duke of *Anjou* is once settled in *Spain*, he will be as much a *Spaniard*, as if he had been born there. Ovid's *Nescio qua natale solum*, hath something in it unanswerable. There are speaking Instances to be giv'n of Princes that have preferr'd the Interest of their native Country, or Countrymen at least, to that of a new acquir'd Crown. We commonly blame our own King *James I.* for something of this; and those who have wrote his Life, give several Instances to prove it, tho his Countrymen say, our Historians have done him no great Justice in that matter.

But admitting, that no attempt shall be made to subject the Crown of *Spain* to that of *France*; it's certain the *French* Court will gain so much by the Duke of *Anjou's* Succession, as to have the *Spaniards* for their good Friends and Allies, and perhaps to join with them in future Wars; and there's no doubt but the *Spaniards* will think themselves happy to come off so easily. Their young King must not in decency be denied the Conversation of his *French* Acquaintance all at once. The Visits of the *French* Nobility to the Court of *Madrid*, is very like to become *ala Mode*. The Residence of *French* Ministers there must not be controverted, and the advancement of some of that Nation to Posts of Honour and Profit will be justifi'd by the practice of other Kingdoms in parallel cases: all which will be improv'd for keeping this Prince tight to the Interests of *France*; and if those methods should kindle any vexatious Jealousies in the minds of the

Dons, there's one infallible way still left, of finding Pensioners to do it of their own number. There's a thousand ways to flatter the *Spaniards* into a belief of the Advantages that must needs redound to them from such an Alliance. A few well contriv'd Rhodomontades, and zealous Chimeras, will go a great way with a People so far gone in Pride and Bigotry. The *French* Court know this to be their weak side, and have begun to manage their Attacks accordingly: What else is meant by those lofty Encomiums that echo from *Verfairs*, of the Gallantry and Wisdom of the *Spanish* Nation, and of the largeness of their Empire? &c. Their Grandees are caress'd; and if large Sums, and larger Promises will do the work, to be sure they shall not be wanting. They are now told, that *France* and *Spain* shall henceforward be one Nation. The former Outrages committed upon them are excus'd, as the Results of the Conjunctions of Times, but nothing such is to be fear'd for the future. We may easily conceive that a Respite from Wars within their own Bowels, must be very acceptable to that languishing Monarchy. It's no small Advantage, that they have now a prospect of a lasting Peace from their nearest and most formidable Enemy. If to this, Proposals be made them of joining with *France*, in promoting Trade, and particularly to recover their Woolen Manufactory, and betwixt them to engross that Trade to the *Straits* and to *Turkey* (which the *French* have attempted by themselves, with far less probability of Success) we may be sure 'twill be taking.

If it shall be further propos'd, to endeavour the Reconquest of some part of their old Dominions in *Europe*, as the seven Provinces, and *Portugal*, or of their new ones in *America*, it must certainly be very tempting. If to this it should be added, that they shall have the Assistance

ance of the *French* for the effecting both, and at the same time for rooting out Heresy, and replanting the Catholick Faith, their Priests will tell them, they are Rebels to Heaven if they neglect the Opportunity. Then what is it that all *Europe*, and the Protestants in particular, have not to fear from this formidable Conjunction of the Sword of *France*, and the Purse of *Spain*? We may assure ourselves, that the See of *Rome*, and the Princes of *Italy* will be glad to give Wings to a design of that Nature: It's more their Interest now, than it was in 1588, when they zealously contributed to divert the Power of *Spain* from looking towards themselves, and sent them to ruin the Northern Heresy, with their invincible Armado: *France* is now more formidable alone, then *Spain* was at that time, and much more when she can entirely depend upon a Catholick King, of her own Lineage and making. The young Politic Pope cannot be ignorant, that sometime or other he may be in danger of having Gens d'Arms sent him from a Prince of the Family of *Bourbon*, instead of the Hackney that he claims as his due for the Kingdom of *Naples*; and therefore will certainly think it his Interest, to consecrate him a whole Army of Horse in return, provided he'll make use of them in a Northern Expedition. The Cardinal Zealots, who chose *Albani*, because they knew him to be willing, and qualified for maintaining the Dignity of the Papal Chair, will be ready to concur with him in every thing that may recover the lost Territories of the Church. No doubt but they have an Occasion in their Eye, which they esteem very proper for giving a vent to their Zeal. There's a certain Prince in the World, whom they call a Confessor, because he sacrific'd three Crowns to his Zeal for the Pontifical Tiara; we have it printed in the *Antwerp Gazette*, publish'd by the Authority of this young Catholic King, *That he hop'd in*

a little time to congratulate the Nominal Prince of Wales upon a good Success equal to his own, and told him, he might depend upon his Friendship and Assistance. It will be none of the fault of the *Spanish* Inquisitors, if he be mistaken in his hopes, or fall short of his Promise. If the Cause of Religion be not sufficient ground of Quarrel, it's but setting up a Chamber at *Madrid*, like that at *Metz*, and they will soon find Causes of another Nature. Prescription of time is not allow'd to be a sufficient Plea by the Modern *French* State-Casuits; and therefore were there none later, the old Expeditions of Sir *Francis Drake* and Sir *Walter Raleigh*, and the Assistance given by Q. *Elizabeth* to the *Hollanders*, to erect themselves into a Free-State, when they revolted from under the Dominion of *Spain*, and our espousing the Title of K. *James* of *Scotland*, in opposition to that of their Infanta, will be cause enough; nay rather than fail; our taking *Jamaica* from them in *Oliver's* time, our own Settlements in the *West-Indies*, to which they pretend the Right of discovery, may be insisted upon. It's in vain to alledg particular Treaties, or the General Treaty at *Reswic*, in defence of our selves. The Treaty of Partition is of a later Date than any of those; and the same distinction betwixt the Design and the Terms that serves to palliate the Breach of that, will excuse the violation of all the rest: and besides, if that will not do, we know the determination of the Council of *Constance*, That Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks.

The next thing to be considered is, the *French King's* Memorial.

By what has been already said, it will appear to be of more advantage to *France*, to have all the Dominions of *Spain* govern'd by her Councils, united to her Crown, or subjected to her as an Homager or Vice-royalty, than to have had the Share allotted her by the Partition; which

which makes the truth of that Allegation very suspicious, *That the French King, by accepting the late K. of Spain's Will, hath prefer'd the publick Peace to his own Advantage.*

The Reflection upon the Treaty of Partition, (p. 2.) as *productive of infinite Troubles, and Misfortunes common to all Europe*, sounds but oddly from the mouth of those that were the first proposers of it, and laid down Arguments to prove the great Advantages that must of necessity redound from it, in order to perswade all *Europe* to engage in it. If the Proposers of this Objection foresaw those infinite Troubles, and common Misfortunes to *Europe*, before they enter'd into the Treaty, it was the highest Injustice for them to engage in it. It's own'd by the Memorial, p. 11. *That the high Dignity of Kings does not excuse them from considering, whether the Wars they undertake be just.* And let the Monarch be never so great, that enters into a War that he knows to be unjust, he who is higher than the highest of Kings, has pronounc'd them accurs'd, that shed innocent Blood : but if the Justice of that Treaty was never disputed till the Crown of *Spain* came to be offer'd to a Grandson of *France*, it would seem that the saying of a great Prince and Legislator too, *That a Gift blinds the Eyes of the wise*, is too applicable in this Case.

The nice distinction betwixt the *Design*, and the *Terms of the Treaty*, smells more of the Ferula than of the Scepter, but will appear to be very ill founded, if we consider, that the design of the Treaty, by the majority of the Treators, was to preserve the Peace of *Europe*, by preventing the Union of the Crowns of *Spain* and *France*, which is now eluded by this surreptitious Will, and the Peace of *Europe* as much endangered by that Conjunction, as if the two Crowns were upon the Head of one and the same Person. There is the more ground to speak thus, that

that the *French King* hath said several times since the late King of Spain's Death, *That henceforward France and Spain shall be one*; and that his Minister hath declar'd to the Diet of the Empire, *That now he designs to keep a good Correspondence with the King of Spain, which puts him in a better Condition than formerly, to assist the Princes of the Empire, and to preserve the Peace of Europe*; to which he might as well have added, *and to disturb the Peace of Europe too*. It's own'd, p. 4. *That the late Will, and the Death of the late K. of Spain, make the difference betwixt the Treaty now, and the Treaty then*: which plainly shews the partiality of the *French Court*; and that they make their own Interest the Rule of Justice and Injustice. The Treaty leaves no room to distinguish betwixt the Design and the Terms of it, whether the K. of Spain die or live. It's evident, that 'twas not to be put in Execution till the Death of that Prince; so that all the Difference must result from the *Will*, his Death is only alledg'd in the Memorial, as a word of course, to fill up room and amuse the Reader.

Whereas 'tis said in that same Page, *That the design of the Treaty was to maintain a general Peace, but the Terms of it now the King of Spain is dead, and hath made such a Will, cause an universal War*: It's a fair Vindication of the Honesty of the Designs of the other Parties concern'd in the said Treaty, and a demonstration of the *French Guilt*. We have the Word of a King and a Prophet too for it, *That an Upright Man will perform what he bargains, tho it be to his hurt*. If this be the Doctrine of Heaven, it's no hard matter to guess whence that other Doctrine comes, which teaches us to break Treaties and Oaths, on pretence of a distinction betwixt the Design and the Terms; otherwise the divinely inspir'd Penman would have inverted the Proposition, and told us, that an Upright Man will not perform what he swears, if it be to his hurt, because when

he

he swore he design'd his own advantage ; but it proving now to be his hurt, he must keep to the design, and not to the terms of his Oath.

That the keeping to the Terms of the Treaty, would cause an universal War, if the *French* had the honesty to perform their part, is demonstrably false, and contrary to what they so frequently boasted of before this Will was obtain'd; viz. *That the Parties concern'd in the Treaty of Partition were able to put it in execution, in spite of all Opposers* : Nay it's in a great part own'd by the Memorial it self in that same Page, where it's said, that the *French King might have possibly obtain'd more considerable advantages by his own Arms, than the Share allotted him by the Treaty, had he design'd to make use of them on occasion of the King of Spain's Death* : then who can doubt but he might have much more easily possess'd himself of that share by the help of the *English* and *Dutch* ?

The main Objection lies in this, *That the Emperor declin'd joyning in the Treaty of Partition, in hopes of having the Arch Duke declared Successor to the whole ; and that if the French Court had not accepted the Will, the Arch Duke was of course declared Universal Heir to all the Dominions of Spain*. But what of all this ? were not the *French, English* and *Dutch*, able to oblige the Arch Duke to content himself with *Spain, the West-Indies* and the *Netherlands*, whatever disposition the King of *Spain* had made by his Will ? It's known to be stipulated in the Treaty, that the Arch Duke should not go into any of the Dominions of *Spain* during the King of *Spain's* Life, nor could he have done it to any purpose, but in the Terms of the Treaty after his death. The *French King* had his Troops ready long before his Catholick Majesty left this World, to have seiz'd upon the share allotted himself by the Treaty, which would have made the Arch Duke's

Duke's Passage into *Spain* very uneasy, upon any other conditions; and tho he should have found means to get thither, the united Forces of those three Nations could soon have dislodg'd him, had he not agreed to the Treaty. This the *French* cannot but be sensible of, when they know what a large Conquest they made upon the Dominions of *Spain* during the last War by their own single Force, against the united endeavours of the Emperor, *Spain*, *England* and *Holland*. But something they must say, and they are resolved to say what's nothing to the purpose, rather than be silent. Why did not they according to the Treaty join with the other Allies, in giving the Emperor two Months time after the K. of *Spain*'s Death, to consider whether he would accept the Treaty or not? As the late King of *Spain*'s Will disappointed the Emperor in his expectation of having the Arch Duke declared Successor, it likewise gave *France* an opportunity of shewing her sincerity and Justice to all the World, by keeping to the Treaty, and proposing still to let the Arch Duke have his allotted share. Who can tell but the Emperor would have accepted it? It's no way improbable but he would, since he finds himself disappointed of his expectations as to the King of *Spain*'s Will, and since 'tis evident, that the honour and advantage he must reap from the Monarchy of *Spain*, tho thus dismembred, is far beyond what he can expect from his Son's continuing Arch Duke. Had the *French* done thus, they might have had some reason to say, that they design'd to preserve the General Peace of *Europe*; but since contrary to the Treaty, they have *vis & modis* obtain'd a Will in their own favour, and resolv'd to stand by it, they have laid a just Foundation for a Universal War, and given just Provocations to their Allies to join with the Emperor in asserting the Right of his Family to all the Dominions of *Spain*;

Spain; which should they think fit to do, may in the end prove as great a disappointment to the House of *Bourbon* as the late King of *Spain's* Will is to the House of *Austria*.

It's pleasant to hear the Memorial say, *That his Allies had no right to those Dominions allotted him by the Treaty*; when the World knows that he could claim no other right to them but by virtue of that Treaty. He had resign'd all the other right that he could pretend to before his Match with the *Infanta*, without which Resignation that Match had never been agreed to, and as has been said already, his Renunciation and hers were ratified afterwards by the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*. It's in vain for the *French* to allege, that he had no Power to give away his Son's Right: for if it were so, he was unjust in entering into that Marriage Contract and Treaty, and he hath repeated his injustice again by giving the *Dauphin's* and Duke of *Burgundy's* Right to the Duke of *Anjou*; and since they insist so much upon the nullity of that Renunciation, it confirms the suspicion that the Duke of *Anjou* is only to act as Viceroy to the Crown of *France*, otherwise they do but jest with the world in talking thus of Right, when in the same Breath they justify what they have done contrary to that pretended Right. Be that how it will, it's certain that this Plea lays an eternal Foundation of Quarrel betwixt the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, if the Duke of *Anjou*, and the Heirs of his Body be any thing else but Viceroys, so far is it from truth, that the accepting of the late King of *Spain's* Will is the best way to preserve the Peace of *Europe*.

It's no less pleasant to hear them tell us, *That it was not his Majesty's design to acquire by a Treaty the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Province of Guipuscoa, and the Dutchy of Lorrain. But his principal end being to maintain the Peace, he treated upon that foundation alone.* Had the

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maintaining the general Peace, been the alone Foundation of his Treaty, there was no need of his treating at all, he had no more to do, but to observe the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, wherein he renounc'd for himself and his Successors for ever, all pretensions to the Crown of *Spain*; and if he had done so, we may very well venture to say, his Allies would not have forc'd those Kingdoms and Provinces upon him: so that if he did not treat for these, he treated either for nothing at all, or else to frighten the *Spaniards* to give him the whole, which is the likeliest of the two, as the Event hath verified.

As a further Testimony of Gratitude to his Allies, the Memorial tells us, *That perhaps he might have obtain'd more considerable Advantages by his Arms, if he had design'd to make use of 'em on occasion of the K. of Spain's Death.* To which it is easy to reply, that perhaps he might have lost greater Advantages by theirs, which will soon appear to be no Paradox, when we consider, that if in order to maintain the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, and to keep the Peace and Ballance of *Europe*, they had join'd with the Emperor and *Spain* to attack him, and sent a good strong Fleet to harrafs his Coasts and bombard his Towns; He would not have found it so easy to withstand their United force now, as he did during the last War, considering how his Men and Mony are exhausted. From all which we have reason to conclude, without a *perhaps*, that they would have given him a severer vomit than they did at the Conclusion of the late War, when they made him disgorge so many large Provinces, and strong Towns. It is no less absurd in the Memorial to tell us, what fears he could have done with his Arms, if he had design'd to make use of them on occasion of the K. of *Spain's* Death, when all the World knows, that he not only threatned both branches of the House of *Austria* with his Arms, if they did

did any thing to prevent the execution of the Treaty of Partition, but march'd his Troops to the Frontiers of *Spain*, to be in a readiness to seize *Fontarabie*, &c. as soon as his Brother-in-Law died, which for ought we know, frightened that poor weak spirited Prince out of this World, sooner than he might have gone.

The pretenees, *p. 5.* that he must have been engag'd in a long and bloody War, and that the *Spaniards* were putting themselves in a posture to keep their Monarchy United, if he had not accepted the Will, are empty and trifling. What could that enfeebled and scattered Monarchy have done to keep it self united against the joint Power of *France*, *England*, and *Holland*? They are not able of themselves to have resisted *France* alone, and much less all three together; the Emperor could give them no Assistance by Sea, nor could he have hindred their being invaded by Land. It's in vain to object, he could have given *France* a diversion on the *Rhine*, for *Lewis XIV* had cut him out work enough at home, by encouraging those Princes that oppose the 9th Electorate, and complain of other Grievances, to arm against him; or if that would not have done, he could have had recourse to the old and never failing Contrivance of the most Christian Kings, which is, to engage the *Turks* to invade Christendom. The *French* and *Dutch* are both on the same Continent with the Emperor, and were more capable of invading him than he is of invading them: those parts of the *Spanish* Dominions assign'd to *France* by the Treaty, might have been torn from the body of the *Spanish* Monarchy, before the Emperor could come to their Relief, and the Confederate Fleets could easily have torn off *America*, which is the Soul of their Monarchy, and then it must have perish'd for ever; of this the *Spaniards* were sensible enough, and therefore had no other way left them, but either to agree to the

Treaty of Partition, which would have been both to their loss and dishonour, or to endeavour to break that Treaty, by throwing themselves into the Arms of a Nation that scorn to be slaves to their Word; and by this means to be rather intire Bond-men, than dismembred Freemen. This may serve for an Answer to the D. of *Savoy's* asserting his Right, in case of the Arch-Dukes acquiescing to the Treaty of Partition; all the World knows that that petty Prince must have unavoidably sought his own Ruin, if he had offer'd to attempt it against the Emperor, *France, England,* and *Holland.*

Enough has been said already to prove, that no Prince of the *French* Blood had any Right to the Crown of *Spain*, but we shall here once for all consider that Assertion scattered up and down the Memorial, and particularly in p. 6. That the late K. of *Spain* by his Will, hath at last done Justice to the true Heirs. It were to be wish'd, that the Author of the Memorial had come to a fix'd determination what this Justice is, for sometimes he alledges this Justice was due only to the Dauphin, and for that end declares the Nullity of his Father and Mothers Renunciation, and here he talks of Justice done to the true Heirs by the King of *Spain's* Will, which excludes the Dauphin and Duke of *Burgundy*, and all that shall afterwards become Kings of *France*, and settles it on the D. of *Anjou*, &c. so that the Justice of an Hereditary lineal Succession, which in most Kingdoms of *Europe*, hath cost so many thousands of deluded Subjects their Lives, is quite destroy'd by this Notion and Practice. Besides, the Memorial contradicts it self in this matter, as has been already observ'd; for if *Lewis XIII* and *XIV's* Renunciations were unjust, the Dauphin's must needs be so too. And tho the Dauphin be such a good natur'd Prince as to declare, *That he shall be glad to say during his whole Life, the King my Father, and the*
King

King my Son : 'Tis a Question whether the Duke of *Burgundy* will be a Prince of such Temper : perhaps there may be a time when some or other will whisper him in the Ear, that the Court of *France* had two different notions of Justice at one and the same time, one that there could be no Justice in a Father's renouncing the right of his eldest Son ; and another that a Father might justly renounce the right of his eldest Son, in favour of the 2^d : and since both those Notions are just, that must be most just, which is most for his glory and advantage ; and therefore since it is more glorious and more advantageous to be King of *France*, *Navar* and *Spain*, &c. then to be only King of *France* and *Navar*. It will be most just for his Brother the Duke of *Anjou* to come home and possess his Appanage in *France*, and restore him the Crown of *Spain*, which is his Birth-right : If this be the case, as 'tis no way impossible, the longest Sword must determine the Justice ; and thus the Peace of *Europe* is excellently well secur'd by the late King of *Spain's* Will, &c.

We shall absolve this Head with one Observation more, which is, that in order to have made the King of *Spain's* Will just, there ought at least to have been an equal Authority and Solemnity at the Ratification of it, as there was at the Ratification of *Louis XIV^{th's}* Contract of Marriage, and of the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, which that Will totally subverts.

Having considered the chief parts of the Memorial, it remains only to take a view of some other particulars in it.

P. 14. He alledges, " That so many considerable Domi-
 " nions being added to *France*, according to the disposi-
 " tion of the Treaty, might have given just Jealousy of
 " the Power of *France*, and that therefore the States
 " should prefer the Succession according to the Will, to
 " the Treaty of Partition. But who sees not that the
 States,

States, and all *Europe*, have more reason to be jealous of the addition of the whole Dominions of *Spain* to the Crown of *France*, or which is all one, that the Entire *Spanish* Monarchy should be under the Government of *French* Councils. Since the Breach of the Treaty of Partition is such a fresh Instance of *French* levity, and the greatest Contempt and Affront that could have been put upon his Majesty of Great *Brittain* and the States, who shall be Guarantees, that this Breach shall stop here, and that it shall not be attended with further Contraventions of other Treaties to the disturbance of their Peace, and of the Universal Repose of *Europe*. When the King of Great *Brittain* and the *Dutch* entred into the Treaty of Partition, they were made to believe that the *French* design'd no other thing by it, but the preventing of new Wars, or as they express'd it in their joint Memorials to the other Potentates of *Europe*, that the Conjuncture of affairs rendred that Treaty as necessary *as the pulling down or blowing up of a Street or some Houses, to prevent a whole Citys being on Flames*. They had no reason to think, that the *French* after being gratify'd so far, would grasp at the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, or offer at giving any further trouble to *Europe* on that account, and therefore whatever their Subjects did suggest as to the danger of their Trade to the *Mediterranean*, they had good ground to believe, that the *French* would have obviated those fears by a faithful performance of the Treaty on their part; but since it hath happen'd otherwise, they have all imaginable reason to say, that the Fears of their own Subjects, and those of *England*, were the effects of a wise foresight, and that therefore it's highly reasonable to lay more stress upon the Judgment of the one and the other in time to come, either as to Treatys or Events, than it would seem by the Memorial they have done hitherto.

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This is a sufficient Answer, to what's asserted in the Memorial, pag. 13. *That there's no prejudice to be perceiv'd arising to the States from the King's accepting the Will.* But further, the People of *Holland* and *England* both, are very apprehensive of Prejudice to be perceiv'd arising from this practise of the *French Court*; and the former especially, think they have very good reason for it, when the *French King* hath promis'd in his Letter to the *Queen Dowager* and *Regency of Spain*, *That his chief care shall be to restore the Spanish Monarchy to the highest Point of Glory it ever arrived at.* This puts them in mind, that they themselves did formerly make a part of the *Spanish Monarchy*, that their Revolt from under its Tyranny was a considerable diminution to its Glory, and hath been no small cause of its declining ever since. They likewise know, and still smart under the sense of it, that *France* hath oftner than once attempted to possess themselves of the whole *Netherlands*, and particularly of their seven Provinces, on pretence of giving him *ill Satisfaction*; for it's now become one of the most awful things of the World, to have great Monarchs complain of receiving *ill Satisfaction*, or of *being ill served*. Nothing less than the ruin of those poor Republicks or Kingdoms so complained of; is sufficient to satisfy Royal Indignation. Besides, they are now upbraided with *Insincerity in demanding what they never design'd to obtain, and of framing Vows contrary to the Interest of their Republick.* This is not only enough to draw the Resentments of *Lewis XIV* upon them, but likewise to increase their own People against them: they are likewise threatn'd if they don't observe such a Conduct, as may merit the honour of his Affection, and the continuation of his good Will; and upbraided with not behaving themselves answerably to the Protection they have receiv'd of His Majesty, and his Ancestors. These are Crimes of an higher Nature than giving him *ill satisfaction*, which occasioned their Countries being overrun by the *French Troops* in 1672, and therefore the poor States have reason to expect severer Treatment now than they met with then, if they don't quickly make their Peace, by breaking the Treaty of Partition too, and acknowledging the Duke of *Anjou* as King of *Spain*. Thus they and we are like to be rewarded for our kindness in entering into a Treaty by which *France* was to be aggrandized with an addition of such considerable Dominions as is own'd in the Memorial, and in which we acted with

so much disinterestedness, that the *French* generously confess pag. 13. *We stipulated no particular advantage to our selves.* Upon the whole, since the Memorial, pag. 11. says, *That it would not be consistent with the King's Equity, and his tender affection to the King of Spain, to turn his Arms against a Nation, for no other reason, but because they offer'd their New King, His Majesty's Grandson, the Crown of one of the most potent Monarchy's of Europe.* We hope it will be allow'd to be as much inconsistent with Equity and Gratitude to his Allies, that His Majesty should turn his Arms against two Nations, for no other reason, but because they were willing to add several Kingdoms and Provinces to *France*, which is already by far the most potent Monarchy in *Europe*, and that they have a greater respect for His Majesty, himself, and his Kingdom, than for his Grandson and his.

This Kindness was so much the more considerable, that the *French* had no reason to expect it from either of those Nations, who, had they intended any thing else by it, but to secure the Peace of *Europe*, had the fairest Pretence in the World to have declin'd it. They knew well enough, that the *French* King had precluded himself from all claim to any part of the Spanish Succession by the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, which tho he had broke it again and again, they were not oblig'd to think it annul'd upon that account, but might (had not their Inclinations to Peace overrul'd their just Causes of Resentment) have made it a handle for a new Confederacy against him upon his offering to seize any of the Spanish Dominions, after his Brother-in-Law's death. And as their kindness ought to be so much the more valued, that it was free and disinterested from all civil Advantages, as the Memorial it self owns; the *French* ought to value it nothing the less, that their Allies discovered themselves to be free from Bigotry, as well as from secular Interests in this Treaty; for they stipulated nothing in favour of the Protestants of *France*, who are persecuted in the most barbarous manner that ever People were, nor in favour of those of *Germany*, who are oppressed and run down on pretence of the 4th Article of the Treaty of *Reswick*, because the *French* had oppressed them in the same manner before that Treaty, which if *Louis XIV* should declare against, as not being the sense he takes that Article in, his neighbouring Princes of *Germany* would not dare to extend it to the ruin of the Protestants as they have done.

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and this the Allies might have insisted upon, before they had entred into that Treaty with *France*, and 'tis probable would have done so, had they not prefer'd the Peace of the whole to that of any part. But it seems that no Concessions or Disinterestedness either in Civil or Religious things, is able to satisfy this new fondness of the French King as a Grandfather, if all *Europe* don't sacrifice their Honour and Interest, to the Advancement of his Grandson, which in the Memorial it self is agreed to be contrary to the Right of the Dauphin his own Son.

The next Head to be considered is, the Influence that this Succession may have upon the Affairs of *Europe*, and what may seem to be the Interest of the several Princes and States of Christendom, with Relation thereunto.

The first we shall consider is *Holland*, because that Country lies next to Danger, and in all probability will be one of the first that may feel the Effects of this Conjunction. The Reasons are these.

1. The Spaniards look upon them as Rebels, and the French King by his promise to endeavour to restore *Spain* to the height of its ancient Glory, seems engaged to assist them in reducing the Hollanders.

2. He seems likewise engag'd to it as the declar'd Champion of that, which they call the Catholick Faith, the advancement of which the late King of *Spain* recommends to his Successor, tho' he should Sacrifice all to it: And it's very well known, that next to *Great-Britain*, *Holland* is the great Bulwark of the Reformation.

3. As the Dutch are next to *England*, the great Barrier of the Protestant Interest, they are the like as to the Civil Liberties of *Europe*, and next to us the greatest Obstacle in the way of an Universal Monarchy, against

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which they have done more than any other Nation in *Europe* beside our selves, which the French have experienced to their Mortification, and therefore are like enough to improve their Advantage against them.

4. The present Conjunction of Affairs lays them more open than ever to a French Conquest. *Flanders* and *Brabant*, their natural *Barriers* are now no more to be accounted such. The Spaniards kept those *Provinces*, not for any Advantage they reap'd from them, for every Man knows they were a great charge to that Monarchy; but their chief Reason of keeping them, was to be a Thorn in the side of *France*, or a Bone for the French to gnaw upon, by which means they were sure to give them a Diversion, when at any time they had a mind to attack the *Body* of their Empire, because the Conservation of those *Provinces* in the Hands of *Spain*, was of such Consequence to the Emperor, *England* and *Holland*, as being in some sort a Joint Barrier to all of them, that they would never suffer the French to take entire possession of them.

But the Scene of Affairs being now chang'd, and *France* and *Spain* acted by the same Councils, both those Crowns will be glad of the opportunity of reducing the Dutch, the former upon the Accounts above mentioned, and the latter, besides the Causes of Hatred to the Dutch, common to them both, can never expect such an easie and fair opportunity of bringing them back to their Ancient Allegiance, which will be the pretence at least for a time.

The danger of the *Hollanders* is increased by the following Reasons.

1. That the *Inhabitants* of the *Spanish Netherlands* are their Enemies on Account of Religion; the *Flemmings* being such bigotted *Papists*, that they think all Protestants

stants damned or little better: 2. That they hate them upon the Account of T R A D E, the Seat of which was formerly at *Antwerp*, but is now removed to *Amsterdam*. 3. That they bear them a Grudge upon some late Emergencies, and charge them with seeking Advantages over them indirectly by the late Treaty, for having the Electoral Prince of *Bavaria* declar'd Successor to *Spain*. 4. That the Dutch Ports and Harbours are so necessary for the French that without them, they can never well succeed in their Designs, for tho' *Newport* and *Ostend* which now we must look upon to be at the command of the French Court, gives them more advantage for their Shipping in the narrow Seas, then formerly they had, yet till the Dutch be rendred incapable of disturbing them with their Fleets, they can never be safe in any naval Expeditions or Designs upon these Parts of *Europe*. Nor can the Staple of Trade be brought back to the *Netherlands*, till the Dutch be broken at Sea.

The Case being thus with the Dutch, it's their Interest in the first Place, to cultivate a good Correspondence with *Great-Britain*, to enter into a League Offensive and Defensive with us, and in order to make it firm and durable, to take such Measures in time to come as may wipe off the Imputation of a selfish and incroaching Temper in Matters of Trade, and to behave themselves so as that we may have no further Occasion to complain of their open or secret Endeavours to hinder the Trade of all or any of these Nations.

It is likewise their Interest to keep a good Correspondence with the Northern Crowns, who are capable of assisting them with Forces by Sea and Land. They must do the like with the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, and the three Princes of the House of *Brunswick*, they being capable to over-balance the Bishop of *Munster*, the Elector

of *Cologne*, the Duke of *Newburg* and Chapter of *Liege*, their *Popish Neighbours*, in Case of a Religious War, which the present Juncture of Affairs seems to threaten.

It is their Interest, in the mean time, to cultivate a Friendship with those Neighbours, and to endeavour to bring them into a defensive League, because of the common Danger they are all threatned with by the Conjunction of *France* and *Spain*; and, above all, they ought to beware of too precipitant Resolves, as to any League with *France*, tho' their Affairs be never so pressing: Their too much haste in that Matter, without consulting *England* and their other *Protestant Neighbours*, may be fatal to themselves and to all *Europe*. The false Steps they took formerlo in clapping up the *Peace of Nimeguen* too soon, contrary to the Opinion of their Stadtholder and their Alley the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, may serve them as a Caution in this Matter.

We come next to consider what may be the Interest of *England*, in the present Juncture: And in the first place, it seems absolutely necessary to enter into a stricter Amity and Friendship with the Dutch than ever. To this End the Joint Endeavours of King and Parliameut are requisite, that if possible all those Causes, real or imaginary, that were formerly made use of to embroil us with such useful Neighbours may be remov'd, and all Affairs relating to Trade amicably adjusted, and so far concerted as the Nature of the Things will bear, that they may not be the Seeds of future Divisions.

In the Reign of the glorious Queen *Elizabeth* it was found to be thee indispenfible Interest of *England* to support the Dutch. And the mischievous Consequences of our Differences were represented by two *Pitchers* swimming together, with this Motto, *Si collidimur frangimur*,
i. e.

i. e. *If we be dashed together we are broke.* It's more our Interest now than 'twas then, to keep a good Understanding and to avoid all Divisions with them. The Spaniards, who at that time were the Champions of Popery, and the Pretenders to the Universal Monarchy, had *France* to oppose them, and no other Countries near us, from whence they could conveniently invade us but *Flanders*, which was liable to the Attacks both of the Dutch and French; whereas *France* and *Spain* are now conjoin'd, and *Flanders* under their Command. So that we may be invaded both from *France* and *Flanders*; nay, and from *Holland* too, if once the French become Masters of that Country, which they may soon be, if we don't use our utmost Endeavours, and cordially join with the Hollanders to prevent it.

This we are oblig'd to by Interest and Gratitude. The Assistance they gave us in the late Revolution, to which we owe all that we enjoy as Men and Christians, hath not only repaid us with Interest what we did for them in Queen *Elizabeth's* time, but laid us under an Obligation of taking care of their safety as well as of our own.

That it is our interest to do so, will soon appear, if we consider, that there is no other Foreign Nation so capable as the Dutch, of giving the French a Diversion by Sea and Land, if they should attempt to invade us. 'Tis certainly our interest to keep the War at a distance as long as we can; and rather to have the Seat of it abroad than in our own Bowels: This we have successfully put in practice in Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign and that of his present Majesty. We have the same Opportunity of doing it still, so long as the Dutch preserve their Liberty. We can either assist them by Forces from *England* or hire Troops from *Germany* and the Northern Crowns to join with them against *France*, if need be. That
will

will give the French a sufficient Diversion upon the Continent ; and it's well enough known what the Dutch and we are capable of doing at Sea, either offensively or defensively, as occasion requires.

But if, on any Account or Pretence whatsoever, we should be so much infatuated, as not to take Joint Measures with the Dutch for our Mutual Support, we may easily foresee that the Consequences will be as follows.

1. That the Dutch must either be totally brought under the Power of *France*, and their Government dissolv'd, or they must be forc'd to submit to such Terms as the French shall impose.

2. If that be the Case, then we are cut off from all Opportunity of giving the French a Diversion, by landing Men peaceably on the Continent.

3. We are not only depriv'd of that powerful Assistance which the Dutch are capable of giving us by Sea, but must have their whole Naval Force in conjunction with that of *France* and *Spain* to fight against, and that they will be an Over-match for us in that Case is not to controverted.

4. We are not only in danger of having all our Trade to the *Mediterranean* cut off, but that to the *Baltic*, and the *East* and *West-Indies* totally destroy'd. We found in the late War what a mighty Interruption *Du Bart* and his Dunkirkers gave to our East-Country Trade, which may soon convince us, that, when once the Sea-ports of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Flanders* are in the Hands of the French, we cannot trade with safety to any of those Parts. For our Commerce to *Turky* and the *Mediterranean*, we must resolve to fight our Way through the *Straits*, and if we should be successful in doing so against such an united Naval Force, as we just now spoke of, which is next to impossible, the Portuguese and Italians will

will not dare to entertain us in any of their Harbours ; nor, were they willing, can it be long ere they run the same Fate with the Dutch, they being in no capacity to withstand the united *Power* of *France*, *Spain* and *Holland* ; and besides, these Nations will find Methods to forestall the Markets by Woollen Manufactures, &c. of their own. Our Trade to the *East-Indies* will be liable to the same Inconveniencies ; we are not only in danger of being attack'd, as going and coming, but of having the French and Dutch Factories in those Countries united against ours, in order to destroy them ; and tho' this were not so, being over-matched at Sea, we can have no opportunity to export our Commodities when they are brought home, as we have hitherto done ; and Trade falling into such a decay, our *People* must of necessity become poor, which will render us incapable of consuming much of those Commodities at Home. We shall labour under the like Inconveniencies as to our *West-India* Plantations and Trade. The French have Settlements so near us, and the Spaniards are so jealous of Rivals in that Trade, that they will speedily and readily concur to ruine us there. 'Tis true, that at present our strength is considerable in those Parts, but when we are not able to relieve and encourage them, as it cannot in that case be reasonably supposed we shall, those *Plantations* must by consequence be over-run by our Confederate Enemies.

5. Our Trade being thus destroy'd by Sea, *Poverty* must needs come upon us like an armed Man, our shipping must decay, which besides the Loss of the vast Treasure, which the Nations has now in Stock that way, will ruine innumerable Families, not only those that belong to Seamen and Masters of Ships ; but Merchants and Tradesmen that liv'd and were employ'd by buying,
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making, exporting and carrying Manufactures to and again. The Consequences of this will quickly affect all Degrees of People from the King to the meanest Day-Labourer, the Revenues of the Government must sink, in all its Branches, and those who have their Dependance upon it must bethink themselves of a new way of Living. The Landed-Mens Rents must fall, the Husbandman and Grazier will not find their wonted Account in their Labour and Industry; so that by necessary Consequence, we must become poor and defenceless.

6. *Holland* being thus run down, we are laid open to an Invasion, whenever *France* and *Spain* think fit, and we are cut off from all possibility of Help from the *Continent*. These are the Consequences that must necessarily ensue our Not concerning our selves in the Support of the Dutch, who if they find themselves reduced to Extremity for want of Assistance, will follow the Example of the Spaniards, and make the best Terms they can for themselves, to prolong the Term of their Liberty, there being some Comfort to be the last that shall be destroy'd. It appears by Sir *W. Temple's* Letters, [printed for Mr. *Tonson*, Vol. I. Page 127.] that they were very near taking such Resolves, when the Dangers that threatned them were scarcely so great, at least not greater than now; his Words are as follow, ' If the
' French shall carry *Flanders*, as they very well may in
' another Campagne, by the Weakness and Disorders
' of the Government here, the Dutch are sensible that
' they must fall to be a Maritime Province of *France*, up-
' on the best Terms they can.

What immediately follows, being this Great Statesman's Opinion of the Dangers that would thence accrue to other parts of *Europe*, and particularly to *England*, its
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thought fit to insert it as follows : ‘ The Empire will expect to see them soon at the *Rhine*, and thereby Masters of four Electors, and what a Condition *England* will be left in by such an Accession of Maritime Forces, as well as Provinces to such a Power as *France* is already, is but too easie and too melancholy a Reflection.

If this was the Opinion of that able and experienced Minister then, we have good Reason to conclude that our danger is much greater at present. The French are now actually at the *Rhine*, possess’d of *Strasburg*, one of the most important Places upon that River, and without the trouble or hazard of a Campaign, have the Liberty to enter *Flanders* when they please ; and that they have a disposition to do so, and are in a readiness for it, is plain enough, from the proffers that have lately been made to the Government of the *Netherlands*, the Threats in the Memorial exhibited to the Dutch, and the Orders that are given for all Protestant Strangers to retire from *Dunkirk*.

’Tis in vain to object, That the Spanish Government will not allow of it : The same Means that have been us’d to oblige them to accept the Duke of *Anjou* for their King, will have influence sufficient to oblige them to that and much more. There’s no want of pretences for the Necessity of it. That known one of preserving those Provinces from any Invasion by *England* and *Holland*, that have not as yet acknowledged the Duke of *Anjou* ; and that other of dislodging the Dutch Troops from the Spanish Garisons, and depositing the Money requisite for that end, are such invincible Arguments as the Government of *Spain* is no ways able to answer at present. Besides, it’s no prudence in them to testify any thing of distrust of *Louis XIV.* at this time, lest he be provoked to assert another sort of Title to their Crown,

than any that is to be claim'd from their own Invitation or their late King's Will; and therefore considering that whilst they must be at Peace with *France*, the *Netherlands* is not of that same Importance to them as formerly, there's no probability, that they will give any Disgust to the French on that Account, and much less break with them.

There are two other Considerations that make this Conjunction of *France* and *Spain* more dangerous to *England*, than the Attempts of the Spaniards alone, when they aimed at the Universal Monarchy.

The 1st is, that those two Kingdoms lie Contiguous and can easily communicate Councils and Forces; whereas the two Branches of the House of *Austria*, were separated from one another at a vast distance, and could not join their Forces without great Charge and Trouble in transporting them by Sea, and long and troublesome Marches by Land, the French can invade us with ease from their own Country, and *Flanders* too, without fatiguing their Troops, as the Spaniards in their Case were obliged to do.

The 2d is this, That the French have our abdicated King and his pretended Issue, upon which they may found a Quarrel with us, and, besides Papists, too many unreasonable and ill-principled Protestants, that adhere to his Title: And how dangerous that sort of Men is, we had like to have found by woful Experience, had not the Almighty prevented the horrid Design of the Assassination and French Invasion. Or if they should think fit to lay aside that Prince's Claim, to keep him and his Issue still Prisoners there, or to dispose of them some other way, they have a Prince of the House of *Savoy*, and several of their own Blood, who have as good Titles by Birth to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, as the Duke

Duke of *Anjou* has to the Crown of *Spain*; and, by taking a step or two further from the direct Line, which in such a Case will break no squares, they may attempt to set one of them upon our Throne. Who knows but the present Humour and Ambition of the French, back'd with so much Power, and encourag'd by such a favourable Opportunity, may put them upon this Project. It would be a very good way to outvy the House of *Austria*. They found a Method to give their Eagle two Heads, and by this Means the French might engraft their Lillies upon three Stocks. So much for our Interest to Join in a strict League with the Dutch for Mutual Support.

In the next place, It would seem to be our Interest to enter into a League with the Emperor and Empire, for Maintaining the Common Liberty of *Europe* against the Formidable Growth of the Power of *France*, and Asserting the Arch-duke's Title to the Crown of *Spain*. The Advantages accruing to us by this would be,

1. That by this Means the French would have a powerful Diversion on the *Upper Rhine*, and in *Italy*; for in that case the Emperour would be encourag'd to use his utmost Efforts, to right his Family, and avenge Himself for the Injustice done him, which would oblige the French King to send powerful Armies to oppose him in both those Countries, and by consequence prevent his Attempts upon *Holland* and *England*, or at least be a good Way to make them abortive.

2. By this Means the Austrian Party in *Spain* would be animated to oppose the French Interest as much as in them lay; and, by entering into a good Correspondence with the King of *Portugal*, might give the French Forces a great Diversion on that side, and make their Impressions elsewhere the less effectual, it being the best way, for lessening the Force of a Stream, to divert it into several Channels.

3. By Vertue of this League with the Emperor, it's very probable we might obtain an ease from *Persecution* for our *Protestant Brethren*, not only in the Empire but in *Hungary* and other Countries under his own immediate Power. This it's highly reasonable to think he would grant, as an Acknowledgment of our Kindness, and on the account of his own Interest; that the French may not improve the *Persecution* in *Hungary* as a Back-door to let in the Turks again upon the Empire. If this were obtain'd it would make good the Defect of the Treaty of *Reswick* on that Head; which hath ruin'd so many Hundreds of Protestant Churches, and exposes the Reformed in the Empire to such barbarous Persecutions, particularly those of the *Palatinate*; for whom, in this Case, the Emperor might easily obtain, nay command Liberty at the Hands of his Brother-in-law, the *Electoꝛ Palatin*.

4. This League betwixt *England*, *Holland* and the Empire, would be one of the surest Methods in the World to prevent a Religious War, and by consequence blow the Tempest over upon *Italy*, which the Court of *Rome* designs should disburthen it self upon us.

But in case the Conclave of *Rome* should have so much Address under the Conduct of their young Politick Head as to find Methods to cement the different Interests of the Emperor and *France*, and to unite them against the Reformation, by Inter-marriages, the Concession of *Milan* to the House of *Austria*, and a Promise of the Assistance of *France* to make the Emperor absolute in *Germany*; provided he resigns his Pretensions to the Spanish Succession, it would seem necessary that we should be provided against it. This project 'tis true will be hard to execute, and some may think it impolitick in *France* to fall in with it, because the Emperor by this means will

become too redoubtable, but considering the Bigotry that possesses both those Families, the known Maxim of the Romish Church, that the Propagation of her Faith must be prefer'd to all other Interests, and that tho' the Emperor were absolute in *Germany*, the United Force of *France*, *Spain* and the *Netherlands*, supported by the Treasures of *America*, will be an Over-match for him, the Proposal may be more tempting to a weak and ambitious Mind than we can imagine.

Be that how it will, it's certain the Protestant Interest is in very great danger, as Matters are now, and must be much more so, if such a Conjunction should happen. Therefore it is requisite that they should bethink themselves of Methods for their own Security in all Events. The Romish Idolatry hath a great Advantage over the Reformation, in these following Particulars:

(1.) That it better suits the ambitious Designs of Princes who have a mind to be arbitrary: For a Large to the Church, they may soon be absolv'd from all Obligations to maintain their Subjects in the possession of their Property; Coronation Oaths, Instruments of Government, *Pacta Conventa*, Claims of Right, Golden Bulls, Constitutions of Diets, Parliaments and Cortes, or what you will, are but so many Cobwebs, that are easily swept down by the Pope's Dispensation. Murders, Assassinations, Massacres, and the greatest of Crimes that Hell can suggest, or that deprav'd Men can execute, may easily be hallow'd by the Pope's Consecration. To break Faith with Hereticks is a Vertue, to observe it is a Crime, by the Determination of their Councils; so that we cannot take too many Precautions against that Religion, and the Princes that profess it, Honour and good Nature does sometimes overcome the

the Poison of their Principles, but that is not to be relied on.

A second Advantage that Popery has over the Reformation is this, That according to their Principles, Men may be as wicked as they please, and yet force their way to Heaven, by Pardons, Indulgencies, Jubilees, Pennances, Soul Masses, &c. but best of all by persecuting and destroying those they call Hereticks, this is a ready Attonement for the greatest Cruelty, or most unnatural Lust; and therefore a Principle that the Reformed ought to provide against, as one of the most prevailing upon deprav'd Nature, that ever the Author of false Religions invented.

A third Advantage they have over the Reformed is this, That the Romanists have a fix'd and certain Head, who protects and assists them all over the World, and to him they have recourse in all Exigences. The Pope or rather the See of *Rome*, is the Centre of their Union; and, tho' their Differences amongst themselves be greater, more numerous, and pursued with as much Acrimony as those among Protestants, the Pope and his Conclave are so politick as to keep all of them within the Pale of the Church, and, to the shame of some Protestants don't narrow the Terms of Communion, so as to throw any of them out; nor are their different Opinions an Obstruction to the Civil Preferment of any Layman of this or that Sect.

In order to counter-balance those Advantages, it follows naturally, That Protestant Princes and States should enter into a League offensive and defensive upon the Account of their Religion. That the Government of every Protestant Kingdom and State should take care that no Protestants, who agree in the establish'd Doctrine of their respective Kingdoms or States; should for their dif-

differences in other things be made incapable of Ecclesiastical or Civil Preferment; that there should be a mutual Forbearance of one another in those minute Differences, and no other Terms of Communion impos'd upon any, but those that are the revealed Terms of Salvation. There's no reformed Nation in the World so guilty of this as *England*, and therefore it's our Interest more than others to beware of it.

The Principles of the Reformation (or, which is all one, true Christianity) are so noble and sublime, that they will not allow us to look for a Spiritual Head any lower than Heaven, it does not therefore follow, but Protestants may agree upon a Common Protector and Civil Head on Earth. This falls naturally upon the Government of our Island, and was gloriously perform'd by *Q. Elizabeth*, notwithstanding the disadvantage of her Sex: Why those who succeeded her, till the late Revolution, did not act the same part, the Reasons are so well known that they need not be insisted on.

But now that God hath bless'd us with a Prince, the Hero of his Age, and the Representative of a Family, which for an hundred Years past, hath been the Scourge of Popery, and the Buckler of the Reformation; what is it that can hinder the Protestant World from acknowledging him as their Common Protector? In order to this it seems to be the Interest of this Nation to enable his Majesty to act as such, and to assist him in an Enquiry, to find out and prevent the Causes why the Protestant Interest has declin'd so much of late all over the World. There was no Cause of wondring at it, when *Louis XIV.* triumphed every-where without controul; and when the Throne of *Great Britain* was become a Votary to *Rome*. But if the Conquests of that Church should still continue to be enlarg'd, when *England* and *Holland*,

Holland, the two great Protestant Powers of *Europe* are united under one gallant Protestant Prince, who hath distinguished himself as much by his Zeal for his Religion, as by his Valour in the Field, it must needs argue an unpardonable Defect some where, which certainly no good *Protestant* will refuse to join with his Majesty, in finding out, and endeavouring to remedy.

In order to enable his Majesty to take upon him this glorious Province; 'tis not only necessary that there should be such a League amongst *Protestant Princes* and *States*, as above-mention'd; and that they should all agree to give his Majesty full Power to enquire into the Invasions made upon the *Protestant Interest*, through the World, and, in the Name of the whole, to protest against them, and demand and attempt a Redress; but that all Differences among our selves should likewise be so far compromised, as it shall not be in the power of any future *Prince* or *Party*, Domestick or Foreign, to arm Protestants of one Denomination, against those of another, on any pretence whatsoever. That was the Method taken in the late Reigns to introduce *Popery* and *Slavery*, and therefore having already suffered under it, we should be the more careful to avoid it. Nor should this Precaution extend only to Differences in Matters of Religion, but also to those of another Nature, which have been made use of to foment Civil Differences amongst us, such as Mens different Opinions about the Extent of *Prerogative*, or the *Privilege* and *Power* of *Parliaments*; by which we have been and continue still to be divided, under the odious Distinctions of *Whig* and *Tory*. There's no wise Man of either of those Denominations, but when sedately discours'd, will tell you, that he's for preserving the true English Constitution; then since it is so, and that the known Laws of the Land are the

Boundary

Boundary betwixt Prerogative and Property. What reason is there that any Man who is willing to give that Security for his Allegiance, which the Law requires, should be look'd upon with an evil Eye, or be thought incapable of serving the State. Such Differences, as they weaken our Mutual Confidence in one another, and render us uneasy at home, make us also the less considerable abroad, and more subject to the Intrigues of Foreign Princes and States. It was a judicious Observation of *Sir William Temple*, in the second Volume of his Letters, Page 229. where he writes thus to *Sir John Trevor*, from the *Hague*, July 22. 1670. 'I am sorry the
' Business of Conventicles gives you so much trouble,
' and would wish we were at a good end of all such
' Controversies which make his Majesty appear abroad
' to have so great and considerable a Number of Subjects
' that have not learnt to obey him, and consequently
' make up no part of his Strength, but seem rather to
' lessen it, and amuse People both at home and abroad
' with Imaginations of Changes: Yet Monsieur *Van Ben-*
' *ninghen* hath represented it hither as a Business which
' his Majesty will easier Master than you seem to be con-
' fident of, but their Interest here may help them to be-
' lieve, as well as to desire it upon the Expectation of
' so many Persons and Stocks as will be brought over to
' them upon this Occasion, and makes, as they sup-
' pose, a considerable increase of their Trade and diminu-
' tion of ours.

These Differences in Opinion are not the only Evils we labour under, we are also divided in Matters of Trade, Company against Company, and all of them against the trading of any other but themselves. It's known what Influences those Divisions have had upon some late Elections; what further influence they may
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have that way upon the Government at last, and by consequence upon our Peace, is not easily foreseen, and cannot be prevented without difficulty, if those whose Business it is don't take speedy and proper Measures to bring those Differences to an accommodation.

The same is to be said as to the Grievances complain'd of by the Scots and Irish; Care ought to be taken, that what they justly complain of should be speedily redress'd. The Advices of such Persons or Trading Companies who have different Views from what the Parliaments of those two Kingdoms think to be their indispensable Interests, seem not so proper to be follow'd in those Matters, an amicable Conference betwixt Commissioners chosen by the Parliaments of all the three Nations, authoris'd for that end by his Majesty, would seem to be a proper Expedient for removing such Misunderstandings as are already crepp'd in, and to prevent such for the future: Our Union is our Safety; further Divisions in the present Conjuncture, may open a Back-door for the common Enemy, and until further Methods can be resolv'd on, it would seem necessary, that nothing should be done which looks like a denial of any thing that these two Nations can justly claim as the Right of their Constitution. His Majesty hath again and again declar'd very graciously, *that he will never believe, that the true Interest of his Crown and his People can be opposite*; which is a fair Warning for all Persons to beware of the Consequences that may follow any Attempts to divide those two interests that ought to be inseparable.

His Majesty having given his Subjects such Assurances on his part, it remains, that we should give him all due Marks of Fidelity and Confidence on ours; and since his Majesty's Courage in War, and Conduct in Peace, are so well known as to be own'd by his very Enemies the high-

highest deference ought to be paid to his Council and Advice, as to what is necessary for enabling us to defend our selves, and to assist our Neighbours as occasion requires ; whether this is best to be done by raising Forces at home, and sending them abroad, or by making use of our native Strength to defend our selves, and hiring Foreign Troops to assist our Allies, and under what Regulations and Provisos for the securing of our Liberties against such Dangers as may be reasonably apprehended from Armies, in our Pay at home or abroad, must be left, as it's fit it should, to the wise Determination of King and Parliament ; betwixt whom when they meet, may Heaven create a good understanding.

In the mean time if his Majesty and his Parliament shall agree upon it as the Interest of the Nation, to enter into a League with the Dutch and the Empire ; &c. to oblige the French King to stand to the Treaty of Partition, or to assert the Archdukes Right to the whole Succession, thus much we may venture to say, That the Naval Force of *England* and *Holland*, commanded by such Persons, as the King and the Nations confide in, may in all probability bring the War to a speedy Conclusion. This we have good reason to believe if besides what is necessary for our Defence at home, we send such Squadrons abroad as may secure the Treasure of the *West-Indies* for the Use of the League. By this means we possess our selves of the most valuable part of the Spanish Monarchy, till the Succession be so settled, as to keep the Ballance of *Europe* in its due Situation. We cut off the Sinews of War from the common Enemy, and make *Spain* and its Dominions in *Europe* a burden to the French instead of an advantage.

In order to all these great Ends. It's requisite that more than ordinary care be taken of his Majestys sacred

Person, our own Safety, as well as that of all *Europe*, seems next to the Divine Protection, to be wrap'd up in his single Life; and that it may be in danger by Assassins, our former Experience, the late publication of *Charnock's* pretended Letter, the known Temper of our Enemies, the present Conjuncture of Affairs, and suspicious Advices from abroad, gives us too just cause to apprehend.

These Considerations having swelled already beyond the Proportion intended at first, what follows shall be dispatch'd in as few words as possible. It's probable that the present Conjuncture may occasion a change in the Conduct of the Court of *Vienna*. It seems to be their Interest, to grant a speedy Redress of all those Grievances complain'd of by the Princes and States of the Empire in Matters Religious or Civil. It's a very false Step in Government, for Princes to invade the Rights of their Subjects, but especially those relating to Conscience, over which there's none but the Tribunal of Heaven can claim any Jurisdiction. It's a point which by all Men that have any regard to Religion is accounted the most tender of any, and as they are the most sensibly touch'd with Injuries of that Nature, their Resentments of them make the deepest Impression. It's therefore the Emperor's Interest to forbid all Violence on that Head immediately. It's a Mortification indeed to haughty Princes to be oblig'd to yield to the demands of their Subjects; but when they are founded upon Justice, and that at the same time those Princes stand in need of the Purse and Swords of their People, it's their Interest to grant their Desires. It had been well if the House of *Austria* had learn'd Wisdom in this Matter from former Experience. There's so much freedom interwoven in the Constitution of the Empire, that Men of Sense there,

there, as well as in some other Parts of the World, think it a very great hardship put upon them, that they must purchase good Laws at the Expence of their Treasure and Blood, when by all the Notions of Government, that we have from Reason or Religion, Princes seem antecedently oblig'd by the Command of the great Legislator to concur in making such Laws, without any such Consideration. As it is the Interest of the Emperor to do thus, it's the Interest of the Electors and Princes of the Empire to accommodate their Differences with him upon as reasonable Terms and as speedily as may be ; their Appeal to *France* will but exasperate Matters, and endanger their Liberty. It's particularly the Interest of the Protestant Princes and States to beware of his Mediation. It would seem more proper for them to have recourse in all such Cases to the Interposition of *England* and *Holland* ; especially in the present Scituation of Affairs, when the Power of *France* is aggrandiz'd to such a formidable height.

As to the Cantons of *Switzerland* and their Allies, it's like that the present Juncture will scarcely oblige them to abandon their Neutrality, because they are liable to Invasions on both sides ; yet considering that *France* is now at Peace with *Spain*, it's the Interest of the Swissers to secure themselves against the Designs of *France*, by fresh Alliances, and considering that the Protestants are by far the most numerous part of the Swissers, joining of the Reformed Cantons in a Protestant League, seems absolutely necessary, and on the whole, it's their Interest to help to keep the Ballance betwxt *France* and *Austria*, in an equal Counterpoise, by such Methods as their Prudence suggests.

For the Princes and States of *Italy*, it's evidently their Interest to do the same, to the Balance of *Christendom*,
for

for to which side soever it incline, they are in danger; but considering that the two Branches of the Family of *Bourbon* lye contiguous to one another, and have a great Naval Force; it's certainly their Interest that the Spanish Succession should rather be settled on the Arch-Duke, and to contribute towards it privately, till an Opportunity offer for doing it otherwise.

It's the same, as to the Portuguese; but as their Danger of being swallowed up immediately obliges them to act with Caution, it's an equal Obligation upon the other Princes of *Europe*, to prevent the Addition of that Kingdom and it's Foreign Plantations, to the House of *Bourbon*; and when any Endeavour of that Nature is made by the Potentates of *Christendom*, it's the undoubted Interest of *Portugal* to join them with their utmost Strength, and to contribute to the same underhand, until such time as they may avow it with safety.

For the Northern Crowns, they must needs expect to have their Neighbouring Dominions on the Continent speedily swallowed up, if once the French become Masters of the *Netherlands*. Their Navigation must in a little time after become meerly precarious, and their Religion and Liberty at the Mercy of the House of *Bourbon*. But since its the Maxim of those two Crowns always to take different sides, it's in the Power of the English and Dutch in Conjunction with the Empire to engage the strongest on our side, and to oblige the other to their good Behaviour, on pain of smarting for it, in case they take Measures contrary to the Protestant Interest, and and the Liberty of *Europe*.

For the Hans Towns on that side, the Form of their Government and the Interest of their Trade will oblige them to join with the Asserters of Liberty; and for the Republick of *Poland*, their Interest is the same.

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They have as much Reason as any People whatever, to dread the Encrease of the French Power, for besides that it will be fatal to their Liberty and Form of Government, they must take Care of giving the French an Opportunity of revenging the Affront put upon them, by rejecting the Prince of *Conti*, and considering the Suspicion that some have of their King to render himself Absolute, and the Crown Hereditary, and that they have their intestine Broils to struggle with; it's probable, that the Trouble they give to *Sweden*, will be of no long duration. the Elector of *Brandenburg*, alone is capable of doing much to bring that War to a Period; and considering his own Interest, and the new Obligations laid upon him by the Emperor, there's ground to believe, that he will take effectual Measures in that Affair.

The Czar of *Muscovy* seem'd by his late Ramble into these Parts of the world, to have no Inclination to the French Interest, but, on the contrary, to hate it; and therefore it cannot be his advantage to carry on the Designs of *France* by disturbing the Peace of the North. That will only expose his own Dominions and the Greek Church to the future Attempts of *France* and *Rome*, and totally ruine his Trade, which he seems desirous to advance: But, if he continue obstinate, it's in the power of the English, Dutch and Swedes to give him a Naval Meeting on the side of *Archangel*, besides what the latter are capable of doing by Land, which may soon convince him, that it is more his Interest to turn his Arms against the effeminate Persians and other Easterlings where he may find better Booty with fewer Blows.

For the Satisfaction of the Reader, we shall conclude with the Articles of the French King's Contract of Marriage

riage, wherein he renounces the Spanish Succession for himself and his Heirs; the Article of the Treaty of the Pyrenees upon the same Subject, and the Article of Philip the Fourth's Will relating to it, that the State of the present Controversie may be set in its full Light.

The Clause of Renunciation, in the Contract of Marriage betwixt his most Christian Majesty and Dona Maria Theresa of Austria.

THAT forasmuch as their most Christian and Catholick Majesties are come and do come to conclude a Marriage, in order to the perpetuating and securing, by means of this Tie of Affection, the publick Peace of Christendom, and between their Majesties, that Love and Amity, which every Body hopes there is between them. As also for what concerns and imports the Good of the Republick and the Preservation of the two Crowns, which being so Great and Puissant, they cannot be united into One; and that from henceforward the Occasions of such a Conjunction may be prevented. Therefore considering the Quality of the Subject, and other just Reasons, more especially that of Equality, which ought to be preserved. Their Majesties Agree and Ordain, by Contract and covenanted Compact between themselves, which shall issue forth, and obtain the Place, Force and Vigour of a firm and establish'd Law for ever, in favour of their Kingdoms, and for the common Welfare of both, That the most Serene Infanta of Spain, *Dona Maria Theresa*, and the Children begot of her Body, whether Male or Female, and their Posterity, 1st, or 2d, 3d, or 4th Generation born after her, in what Degree soever they may be; that is to say, for ever, neither can succeed, nor may succeed to the Kingdoms, Estates,

Estates, Signiories and Dominions which belong or shall belong to his Catholick Majesty, and which are comprehended under the Titles and Qualities mention'd in this present Capitulation, nor to any of his other Kingdoms, Estates, Signiories, Provinces, adjacent Islands, Captainships, nor to the Frontiers which his Catholick Majesty possesseth at present, or which do or may belong to him, as well within as without the Kingdom of *Spain*, and which for the future his Catholick Majesty or his Successors shall have or possess, or which shall belong to him or them; nor to any that are comprehended in these, or depend upon them; nor to any of those which hereafter at any time whatever may accrue to him, or which he may acquire or add to his said Kingdoms, Estates or Dominions, or which he may regain, or which may escheat to him by Devolution, or by any other Title, Right or Reason whatsoever, tho' it were during the Life of the said most Serene Infanta, *Dona Maria Theresa*, or after her Death in the Life-time of any of her Off-spring, first, second, third born, or further, whereby any Ground or Grounds in Law, by which either of Right, or by the Laws and Customs of the said Kingdom, Estates or Dominions, or by the Disposals of Titles, by which they might succeed or pretend to succeed to the said Kingdoms, Estates or Dominions may be said to belong to them from the Succession, in all which Cases the said *Dona Maria Theresa* says and declares her self to be from henceforth excluded, and to remain truly and lawfully excluded, together with all her Children and Posterity, Male or Female, tho' they would or could say or pretend, that in their persons neither the said Reasons of State, nor any others, upon which the said Exclusion might be grounded, could be of force, or

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could or ought to be considered, or that they should alledge (which God forbid) that the Succession of the Catholick King, or his most serene Princes or Infants, and abundance of Males which he has and may have for his lawful Successors were fail'd and extinct. As also, notwithstanding all the Laws and Customs of the Crown of *France*, which, to the Exclusion of the Successors to that Crown, oppose themselves to the above-mentioned Exclusion, as well at present as for the time to come: Upon which Considerations join'd together, and every one in particular, their said Majesties abrogate whatever they contradict or impeach being contained in this Contract, and whatever may hinder the Accomplishment and Execution thereof, and that for the Approbation and Ratification of this present Capitulation, they derogate from all things prejudicial to it, and hold them derogated.

The Ratification of His Most Christian Majesty.

WE, with the Advice of the Queen, our thrice honoured Lady and Mother, and our most beloved only Brother the Duke of *Anjou*, several Princes, Dukes, Peers, and Officers, of our Crown, and other great and remarkable Personages of our Council, after we have caus'd the said Treaty to be read Word by Word, have agreed to it, approv'd and ratify'd, and do agree to it, approve and ratify it, in all and every the Points and Articles by these Presents Sign'd with our Hand, promising, upon the Faith and Word of a King inviolably to fulfil, observe and hold, without ever going or coming in opposition to it, directly or indirectly, in any sort or manner whatever; abrogating to that end, as we do hereby abrogate, all Laws, Customs, and Dispo-

Disposals to the contrary; for such is our Pleasure. In witness whereof, we have affixed our Seal to these Presents. Given at *Tholouse* the 24th of *November*, in the Year of Grace 1659. and 17th of Our Reign. Sign'd *Louis*; and below, by the King *Lomenie*.

The Act of Renunciation by the Infanta.

THE Lady *Maria Theresa*, Infanta of both *Spains*, and by the Grace of God future Queen of *France*, eldest Daughter of the most High, most Excellent, and Potent Prince, *Don Philip IV.* by the same Grace Catholick King of both *Spains*, my Lord, and of the most High, most Excellent, Potent Princess, the Lady *Isabella*, Catholick Queen, who rests in glory. By this Instrument and Act of Renunciation, and what is therein over and above contain'd, be it notorious and manifest, to those who have any knowledge of it, in any manner whatever it be, that by the second and fourth Article of the Treaty of my Marriage, promis'd with the most High, most Excellent, and most Potent Prince *Louis XIV.* most Christian King of *France*, concluded in the Island call'd the *Isle of Pheasants*, in the River *Bidassoa*, within the Jurisdiction of the Province of *Guipuscoa*, and these Kingdoms, with that of *France*, the 7th of *November*, of the last Year 1659. it was resolv'd and decreed, that the King my Lord, because, and in consideration of this Marriage, and to the end I should carry along with me my Dowry, and my own proper Goods, should promise that he would give me 500000 Crowns in Sun-Gold, which should be paid and deliver'd at the place, and within the Terms specified in the said Article, to the most Christian King, or to such Person as should have his Power; and that after that, I should content my self and rest satisfied

and desist from all Claims and Actions which belong'd, or might belong to me, either at present or for the future, to the Estates and Inheritance of the most Serene Queen the Lady *Isabella* my Mother, and to the future Succession to the King my Lord, whom God have in his keeping, and to all that might belong or appertain to me as the Daughter and Heiress of their Catholick Majesties, and to their Right and Sovereignty, and to any other Title thought of, or not thought of, known or unknown, as well by the Paternal and Maternal Line, direct or collateral, mediate or immediate; and that being to solemnize the Marriage by present promise, I must relinquish and renounce all my Rights and Actions to the King my Lord, or to the Person who shall represent him; and that it is his His Majesty's Will and Pleasure, as is stipulated and declar'd more particularly by the said second and fourth Articles, which I have read and heard read several times, being to consent that this Act should be drawn up, and which I am willing should be here inserted, and set down Letter for Letter, and Word for Word.

The Seventeenth Article of Philip the Fourth's Will confirming this Renunciation.

FOR the fulfilling of these Treaties, the Infanta, Madam *Maria*, my Daughter, passed that Renunciation under a solemn Oath in the City of *Fontarabie*, June 2. 1660. Counter-sign'd by Don *Ferdinand de Fonseca Ruiz de Contrera*, our Secretary of State and Notary Publick of those Kingdoms; and altho' we hope that the said Infanta, our Daughter, and the most Christian King her Husband, will fulfil and observe whatever is above-mention'd, and whatever is over and above con-

contain'd in the said Treaty of Marriage, and in the Renunciation, to be an Obligation of Justice and Conscience; nevertheless, that we may by all the most direct ways secure the fulfilling of it in a Matter and in an Affair wherein consists the Peace and Repose of all Christendom, behaving our selves as we do in the Quality of a Father, and Natural Lord of all our Kingdoms, Estates and Demesnes, by virtue of that Sovereign Authority, which we in all due Right possess, to dispose, and for the greatest benefit of our Subjects and the common Cause, to provide for their better Government, and to prevent the great Damages that may ensue from a Conjunction of the two Crowns; and their Dependencies, of our own proper Motion, certain Knowledge and Royal and Absolute Power, of which it is our Pleasure to make use; and which we do make use of with a notorious and entire Assurance of the Example of our Kingdoms and Dominions, by excluding the eldest Children and their Posterity, by reason, and because of Treaties of Peace and Marriage, and for other Considerations Us thereunto moving, we declare, that the most Serene Infanta, Madam *Maria Theresia*, our Daughter, and the Children which she shall have by this Marriage, Male or Female, and their Postery, shall be and remain excluded: And forasmuch as through necessity we exclude them from all Right or Hope which they shall or may have in any case whatever, that may happen to any of our Kingdoms, Estates and Dominions, for ever and ever, as if they had never been born. We declare, That this Exclusion, and all that has been settled, and which we settle, in consideration of it, in the Person of the Infanta, Madam *Maria Tharesa*, our Daughter, and her Posterity by this Marriage, or Female, ought to be so observ'd; and forasmuch as there is a necessity for
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it, We will and Command, that it be observ'd, fulfill'd and executed in the Person of the most Serene Queen, Madam *Ann*, our Sister, and her Posterity, in conformity to her Treaty before Marriage and the Renunciation, and what his Majesty Don *Philip* III. our Lord and Father settled by his said Law, and by his last Will above recited, concerted and accorded between the two Crowns; and we approve it upon the same Conditions, and with the same Force as Laws ought to have, that are granted and made among Sovereign Princes, using their absolute Power. And we revoke, annul, derogate and abrogate all and every Law and Laws, Rights, Settlements and Customs, which may in any manner, whatever it were or may be, hinder this Exclusion, as if every one were express'd, that particular mention were made of it. We also declare, That if it should so happen, which God forbid, that the most Serene Infanta, should come to be a Widow, without having any Issue by this Marriage, and that he should return into *Spain*, for the convenience of the Publick good; or, upon just Considerations, should marry again with our consent, or of the Prince, our Son, after our decease. We Ordain, and such is our Will and Pleasure, That neither the said Exclusion nor Renunciation shall deprive her of any thing, but that she and the Children of the second Wedlock, provided it be not in *France*, may be capable of succeeding in the said Kingdoms, Estates, &c.

The Thirty third Article of the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

AND to the end, that this Peace, Union, Confederacy and good Correspondence, may, as is desir'd, be so much the more firm, durable, and indissolvable, the said two Principal Ministers, the Cardinal Duke, and the

the Marquis Count Duke, by Vertue of the special Powers which they had for this End, from their two Lords and Kings, have agreed and concluded, in their Name, the Marriage of the most Christian King with the most Serene Infanta, the Lady *Mary Therese*, eldest Daughter to the Catholick King, and the same Day of the date of these Presents, have made and sign'd a particular Treaty, to which they refer concerning the Reciprocal Conditions of the said Marriage, and the Time of its Celebration; which separate Treaty, and the Capitulation of Marriage, are of the same Force and Vigor, with the present Treaty of Peace, as being the principal and most worthy part of it, as well as the greatest and most precious Pledge of the Certainty of its Duration.

From all these Solemn and Authentic Acts we may easily see through the Justice of the French Pretentions to the Succession of *Spain*. By these it is also evident that this Succession is in the Opinion of the United Wisdom of the Spanish Nation, contrary to their Interest. There's no ground to alledge, that it is chang'd, as to that Matter, since the making of this Treaty; for the Reasons on which these Renunciations were founded are permanent and durable, both in relation to *Europe* and that particular Kingdom: The Precautions in their King's Will against admitting Foreigners into Offices of Trust and Council signifie nothing; the whole Junta entrusted with the Administration is capable of being gain'd, and so much the more that they have a Cardinal-Priest at their Head. There's none so likely to betray, or that have so frequently betray'd Kingdoms and States, as Men of that Order, when admitted to any share of Council or Action. It's the Interest of *Spain*, to endeavour as much as in them lies to have their Government restor'd on the Foot of these Treaties; to encourage the Pretensions of the Imperial Family in the most secret and polite Manner, and when any probable Attempts are made for asserting them, to exert their whole Strength, and shake off the *French Yoke*; they must otherwise resolve to become a Province of *France*, and in a little time to lose their Sovereignty; tho' they may retain the Name of it. They have Instances enough in *Europe* to convince them of the danger of being so treated; but there's no need of looking any farther than their

new *French* Masters; they have from time to time annex'd other Sovereignties to their Crown; by which they have aggrandiz'd themselves and impoverish'd those Countries so united, the better to keep them under subjection. That this may not be their Fate, they must take special care; that the *English* and *Dutch* have not the use of their Ports deny'd them, and that the Traders of those Nations be not discourag'd by new Indulto's upon their Bullion, or hindrance of their woollem Manufactories, &c. on any Pretence whatsoever; for as we cannot well drive a *Mediterranean-Trade* without the use of their Harbours, and particularly *Cadiz*; if once we be restrain'd in that, it will issue in their own ruine, and deprive them of the only Friends that are capable to defend them in the enjoyment of what Liberty they have left, or in the recovery of what they have lost.

P O S T S C R I P T.

Since the Writing of this, the Scene of Affairs in the *North* is alter'd, by the defeat of the *Muscovites* before *Nerva*; which, if duly improv'd, may be of great Advantage to the House of *Austria* and those that joyn them, to bring the *French* to Reason. The Northern Crowns, being now deliver'd from an impending Storm, are at leisure, if they please, to assist his Imperial Majesty with a considerable Force by Sea; and as this may be of use to him, it will be one of the best Methods to prevent their falling out betwixt themselves: The Emperor has it in his Power, as they are Princes of the Empire, to give them such Incouragement as may readily induce them to it. In that case the King of *Poland*, by the Jealousies of his new Subjects, the Danger of losing his old Ones, and Promises of Favour which the Emperor may grant him, will probably be forc'd to lay down his Arms, and so much the more readily, that his Enemies are Victorious. Nor would it be improper to encourage the *Czar* to turn his Arms Eastward or Southerly, where his Lawrels, that are Wither'd by the Northern Frosts, may be reviv'd again by the Beams of the Sun. This would be one effectual Way to prevent new Troubles from the *Turks*, and give his Imperial Majesty a good opportunity of obliging some other People to act more like Christians.

F I N I S.

